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This paper proposes a novel international transmission mechanism based on the assumption of deep
habits. The term deep habits stands for a preference specification according to which  consumers form
habits on a good-by-good basis. Under deep habits, firms face more elastic demand functions in markets
where nonhabitual demand is high relative to habitual demand, creating an incentive to price discriminate.
We refer to this type of price discrimination as pricing to habits. In the presence of pricing to habits,
innovations to domestic aggregate demand induce a decline in markups in the domestic country but
not abroad, leading to a departure  from the law of one price. In this way, the proposed pricing-to-habit
mechanism can explain the observation that prices of the same good across countries, expressed in
the same currency, vary over the business cycle. Furthermore, it can account for the empirical fact
that in response to a positive domestic demand shock, such as an increase in government spending,






















A long-standing puzzle in open economy macroeconomics is the fact that prices of the same
good across countries, expressed in the same currency, not only diﬀer but diﬀer widely and
persistently over the business cycle. The observed deviations from the law of one price hold
even for individual goods that are actively traded internationally and even in the absence of
tariﬀs or quotas (see Pinelopi Goldberg and Michael Knetter, 1997, and Mario Crucini and
Mototsugu Shintani, 2006).
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to explaining the observed violations in the
law of one price. We embed the deep habit mechanism due to Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and
Uribe (2006a) into a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. We show that when
habits are formed at the level of individual goods, as opposed to at the level of aggregate
consumption goods, ﬁrms have an incentive to lower markups in markets where aggregate
demand is strong and to raise markups in markets where demand is weak. In equilibrium,
ﬁrms price discriminate across markets exhibiting diﬀerent ratios of current to habitual
demand. We refer to this type of price discrimination as pricing to habits. Our pricing-to-
habit formulation is in the tradition of models displaying pricing to market due to customer
switching costs, as in Kenneth Froot and Paul Klemperer (1989).
Under pricing to habits, an expansionary domestic demand shock induces a decline in
prices in the domestic country but not abroad, leading to a departure from the law of one
price. In addition, the pricing-to-habit mechanism gives rise to two important predictions.
Namely, in response to a positive domestic demand shock the real exchange rate, deﬁned as
the ratio of foreign to domestic CPI indices expressed in the same currency, depreciates and
private consumption expands. These predictions of the pricing-to-habit model are consistent
with recent empirical evidence on the eﬀects of government expenditure shocks on interna-
tional relative prices and aggregate demand (e.g., Tommaso Monacelli and Roberto Perotti,
2006).
12 A Two-Country Model With Deep Habits
The economy consists of two countries, the home country and the foreign country. Each
country specializes in the production of a set of diﬀerentiated goods. We denote by a the set
of goods produced by the home country and by b the set of goods produced by the foreign
country. All goods are internationally traded. To emphasize the transmission mechanism
invoked by deep habits, we abstract from a number of important frictions that are common
elements of the related literature, such as sticky prices and wages, distribution costs, non-
traded goods, rule-of-thumb consumers, nonseparabilities of preferences across consumption
and leisure, incomplete international asset markets, tariﬀs, quotas, and other trade barriers.
In what follows, we keep the presentation of the model and the characterization of equi-
librium concise. A separate technical appendix (Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe, 2006b)
contains a detailed derivation.
2.1 Households
We describe the household problem in the domestic economy. The foreign counterpart is a
mirror image. The domestic economy is populated by a large number of identical households
with preferences deﬁned over consumption of a composite good, xt, and labor eﬀort, ht, and
described by the utility function E0
P∞
t=0 βt [φln(xt)+( 1− φ)ln(1 − ht)], with φ ∈ (0,1).








ω ∈ (0,1) and ξ>0. The variable xc
a,t denotes a habit-adjusted composite consumption
good of varieties of goods of type a. The variable xc
b,t denotes a habit-adjusted composite
consumption good of varieties of goods of type b. Following Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe
(2006a), we introduce deep habits. Speciﬁcally, we assume that habits form at the level of
each individual variety of goods instead of at the level of the aggregate consumption good.
Habits are external to the individual household (i.e., we model catching up with the Joneses
good-by-good). Formally, xc
a,t is given by xc
a,t =
hR 1




2denotes consumption of variety i of goods belonging to the set a in period t. The variable sc
i,a,t
denotes the stock of external habit in consumption of variety i of good a. This habit stock
is assumed to evolve according to the following law of motion sc
i,a,t = ρsc
i,a,t−1 +( 1− ρ)˜ ci,a,t,
where ˜ ci,a,t denotes the average per capita consumption of variety i of good a in the domestic
country; that is, ˜ ci,a,t is the integral of ci,a,t over all domestic households. The parameter
θ ∈ [0,1) measures the intensity of deep external habits. When θ is equal to zero, preferences
display no deep habit formation. The parameter η>0 represents the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution across varieties, and the parameter 1 − ρ ∈ (0,1] denotes the rate at which
the stock of external habits depreciates over time.
Similarly, xc
b,t is given by xc
b,t =
hR 1






(1 − ρ)˜ ci,b,t. For simplicity, we assume that the deep-habit parameter θ is common across
varieties and types of goods.
It can be shown that this preference structure implies the following demand functions for


























respectively. Note that the demand for each variety of good a, say, is decreasing in its relative
price, Pi,a,t/Pa,t, increasing in the level of habit-adjusted consumption of the composite good
of type a, xc
a,t, and increasing in the stock of habit of the variety in question sc
i,a,t−1.
2.2 The Government
We assume that real government expenditures, denoted by gt, are exogenous and sto-
chastic and follow a univariate ﬁrst-order autoregressive process of the form ln(gt/¯ g)=
ρg ln(gt−1/¯ g)+￿
g
t, where the innovation ￿
g
t distributes i.i.d. with mean zero and standard de-
viation σ￿g. Public spending is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation. The government aggregates





b,t, using the same aggregator function as the private sector. Like
households, the government forms habits on consumption of individual varieties of goods.
3This assumption is important for understanding the transmission of government purchases
shocks in the context of our model. It is less important in driving the transmission of other
types of demand disturbances, such as preference shocks. We motivate the deep-habit for-
mulation in public spending by assuming that private households value public goods in a way
that is separable from private consumption and leisure and that households derive habits
from consumption of government-provided goods. Alternatively, one can assume that the
government forms procurement relationships that create a tendency for it to favor trans-
actions with sellers that supplied public goods in the past. We treat government habits
as external. Conceivably, government habits could be treated as internal to the govern-
ment even if they are external to their beneﬁciaries, namely households. This alternative is,
however, less tractable, and is therefore not pursued here.





















Each individual variety of goods (of type a or b) is assumed to be produced by a monopolist.
Each good i ∈ (0,1) is manufactured using labor as the sole input with a linear production
technology, yi,a,t = hi,a,t, where yi,a,t denotes output of variety i of good a in period t and
hi,a,t denotes labor input in producing variety i of good a.
The demand function faced by the producer of variety i of good a has a domestic and a






















4where di,a,t ≡ ci,a,t+gi,a,t and d∗
i,a,t ≡ c∗
i,a,t+g∗
i,a,t denote, respectively, the domestic and foreign








i,a,t denote, respectively, the domestic and foreign aggregate stocks of habit








respectively, domestic and foreign measures of habit-adjusted aggregate demands for the
composite good a in period t.
A number of important implications for the model’s predictions regarding deviations from
the law of one price are evident from inspection of the above demand functions. First, the
demand function for an individual variety of goods is the sum of a price-elastic component
and a price inelastic component. The price elastic component has price elasticity η and is
proportional to a measure of current aggregate demand (xa,t in the domestic market and
x∗
a,t in the foreign market). The price inelastic term is purely habitual in nature. It follows
that the price elasticity of demand is a weighted average of η and 0, with the weight on
η given by the relative importance of the price-elastic, nonhabitual demand component in
total demand. An increase in aggregate demand enlarges the importance of the price elastic
component of demand increasing the price elasticity. In other words, the price elasticity
of demand is procyclical. Second, the fact that the price elasticity is procyclical opens the
possibility for markups to move countercyclically in equilibrium. Third, because the price
elasticity of demand can in principle be diﬀerent in the domestic and the foreign markets,
it follows that ﬁrms have an incentive to charge diﬀerent markups (via price discrimination)
domestically and abroad. We refer to this incentive for price discrimination as ‘pricing to
habits’ as it originates from the presence of a habitual demand for individual varieties of
goods. More importantly, pricing to habits gives rise to deviations from the law of one price
over the business cycle at the level of individual goods traded across borders. Finally, because
ﬁrms understand that the stock of habit is a weighted average of all past sales, their proﬁt-
maximization problem is dynamic in nature. Thus, customer-market and brand-switching
cost considerations in the spirit of Edmund Phelps and Sidney Winter (1970) and Froot and
5Klemperer (1989) will endogenously emerge in the pricing behavior of ﬁrms, aﬀecting the
size and persistence of deviations from the law of one price.
3 Deviations from the Law of One Price
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms producing varieties of good a for the domestic market
will charge the same price. That is, Pi,a,t = Pa,t for all i. Similarly, all ﬁrms producing
varieties of good a for the foreign market will charge the same price, or P ∗
i,a,t = P ∗
a,t for all i.
The same will be true for foreign ﬁrms producing good b, that is, Pi,b,t = Pb,t and P ∗
i,b,t = P ∗
b,t
for all i.
We now examine a few equilibrium conditions that are insightful for communicating the
potential of the pricing-to-habit theory to predict persistent and volatile deviations from
the law of one price in international goods markets. For the complete set of equilibrium
conditions, see Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2006b). To simplify the exposition, we
consider the case in which all stocks of habit depreciate completely after one period (ρ = 0).
In equilibrium, the markup of price over marginal cost charged on varieties of good a in









where Ωa,t is the present discounted value of a sale in the domestic market in period t+1. Note
that in the absence of deep habits (θ = 0), the markup is constant and equal to 1/(1−1/η).
Under deep habits, the markup falls in response to expansions in aggregate demand for good
a, da,t/da,t−1. This is the price elasticity eﬀect, originating from the fact that when demand
increases, the relative importance of the price-inelastic (or habitual) component of demand
falls. In addition, the markup is decreasing in the present discounted value of a future sale,
Ωa,t. This is the intertemporal eﬀect of deep habits explained in detail in Ravn, Schmitt-
Groh´ e, and Uribe (2006a). When the present value of a future sale increases, it pays for the
6ﬁrm to invest in market share today by lowering current markups.


















Comparing the expressions for the domestic and foreign markups for good a conveys intuition
for the central result of this paper, namely, that pricing to habits can lead to deviations
from the law of one price over the business cycle. In eﬀect, any disturbance that produces
an asymmetric response in aggregate demand across countries (i.e., any disturbance that
produces variations in da,t−1/da,t relative to d∗
a,t−1/d∗
a,t) will induce divergence in prices for
the same good across countries. In the same way, shocks that aﬀect the present value of
future sales asymmetrically across countries will bring about deviations in the law of one
price for individual goods.
Given that the marginal cost of producing variety i of good a is the same regardless
of whether the good is sold in the domestic or the foreign market, the ratio of foreign to
domestic markups for a particular good equals the real exchange rate for that particular
good. Formally, letting ea,t ≡ P ∗
a,t/Pa,t denote the real exchange rate for goods of type a,w e
have that ea,t =
µ∗
a,t
µa,t. It follows from this expression that, to the extent that it can predict
cyclical diﬀerences in markups across countries, the pricing-to-habit theory will succeed in
generating cyclical deviations from the law of one price.
4 International Adjustment to Demand Shocks
To illustrate the role of the pricing-to-habit mechanism in propagating aggregate shocks, we
study the equilibrium response of our model economy to an innovation in domestic govern-
ment purchases. The reason for our focus on the eﬀects of demand shocks is twofold. First, a
fast-growing empirical literature argues that demand shocks are a major source of business-
cycle ﬂuctuations in the United States and Europe (see Jordi Gal´ ı and Pau Rabanal, 2004).
7Second, recent empirical work has estimated the international transmission of a particular
identiﬁed demand shock, namely innovations in government purchases (see Monacelli and
Perotti, 2006, and references cited therein), providing a benchmark to gauge the qualitative
success of our model.
We calibrate the model as follows: β =0 .99, φ =0 .15, ω =0 .75, ξ =1 .5, η =6 ,
θ =0 .6, ρ =0 .85, ¯ g =0 .0622, and ρg =0 .87. We note that if the habit parameter θ is set
close to unity, equilibria in which expectations are self fulﬁlling may arise. We provide more
discussion on calibration in the expanded version of this paper (Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and
Uribe, 2006b).
Figure 1 shows impulse response functions to a one-percent innovation in domestic gov-
ernment spending. The model displays signiﬁcant pricing to habits. In eﬀect, as shown in the
top two panels of the ﬁgure, domestic markups on both domestically and foreign produced
goods (µa,t and µb,t) fall, whereas foreign markups on both goods (µ∗
a,t and µ∗
b,t) increase.
The diﬀerence in markup movements across borders is due to the fact that aggregate demand
in the home country, where the innovation in public spending originates, increases whereas
aggregate demand in the foreign country contracts slightly.
The asymmetric response of markups for the same type of good across countries together
with the fact that all goods of the same variety are produced at the same marginal cost,
independently of their ﬁnal destination, implies that prices in the domestic country fall
relative to prices abroad. That is, the government spending shock triggers deviations from
the law of one price across all goods. The panels in the second row of Figure 1 show that the
good-speciﬁc real exchange rates (ea,t ≡ P ∗
a,t/Pa,t and eb,t ≡ P ∗
b,t/Pb,t) depreciate, indicating
that both type of goods become relatively cheaper domestically than abroad.
The generalized fall in domestic prices (of both importable and exportable goods) leads to
a depreciation of the CPI real exchange rate denoted et ≡ P ∗
t /Pt, where Pt ≡ γPa,t+(1−γ)Pb,t
and P ∗
t ≡ (1 − γ)P ∗
a,t + γP∗
b,t denote, respectively, the domestic and foreign consumer price
indices, and where γ denotes the steady-state share of domestic absorption of good a in
8Figure 1: Impulse Response To A One-Percent Innovation in Domestic Government Pur-
chases




























































































Note: All responses are expressed in percent deviations from steady state with the
exception of the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio, which is expressed in level deviations
from steady state.
9total domestic absorption. (See Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe, 2006b, for more detail on
the construction of consumer price indices under deep habits.) The left panel in the third
row of Figure 1 shows that the real exchange rate depreciates (i.e., et increases), making
consumption in the domestic country relatively less expensive than in the foreign country.
The predicted real depreciation in response to an expansion in domestic government
spending is consistent with recent empirical evidence reported in Monacelli and Perotti
(2006). These authors use a structural VAR model to identify innovations to government
spending. Using data from four developed countries (the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia) since the breakdown of Bretton Woods, Monacelli and Perotti ﬁnd
that an exogenous increase in government spending leads to a protracted depreciation of the
real exchange rate.
The domestic real wage rate increases with the expansion in government spending, as
shown with a solid line in the right panel of the third row of Figure 1. The reason for
this increase in wages is as follows: An increase in (unproductive) government spending
makes consumers poorer, creating a tendency for agents to consume less and work more. At
the same time, the implied decline in domestic markups, which has the same eﬀect on the
demand for labor as an increase in total factor productivity, causes the demand for labor to
expand in the domestic country. This increase in the demand for labor is suﬃciently strong
to cause the real wage to increase following the innovation in government spending.
In turn, the rise in wages induces workers to substitute consumption for leisure. This
substitution eﬀect dominates the negative wealth eﬀect associated with higher government
spending, resulting in an increase in consumption in equilibrium, as shown with a solid line
in the bottom left panel of Figure 1. The increase in consumption predicted by the model is
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in the studies by Gal´ ı et al. (forthcoming)
and Monacelli and Perotti (2006).
The implied expansion in aggregate domestic absorption triggered by the increase in
public spending causes a deterioration in the trade balance. As shown in the bottom right
10panel of Figure 1, the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is little changed on impact, but then falls
and remains below trend throughout the transition. Again, this prediction of the pricing-to-
habits model is in line with the empirical regularities documented in Monacelli and Perotti
(2006).
To highlight the role of pricing to habits in shaping the international transmission of
government spending shocks, we compare the dynamics of the deep habit model with those
of a model in which habits are formed at the level of the composite goods a and b, as opposed
to at the level of each individual variety of goods. We refer to this standard habit-formation
formulation as superﬁcial habits. Under superﬁcial habits, the problem of the ﬁrm ceases
to be dynamic, as the demand for each individual variety of good does no longer depend
on past consumption of that variety. As a result, ﬁrms face isoelastic demand functions
domestically and abroad. It follows that ﬁrms set constant markups, which implies the
absence of variations in deviations from the law of one price on a good-by-good basis over
the business cycle. In particular, the good-speciﬁc real exchange rates ea,t ≡ P ∗
a,t/Pa,t and
eb,t ≡ P ∗
b,t/Pb,t are constant over time when habits take the standard superﬁcial form.
Rows three and four of Figure 1 plot with dashed lines the response of the real exchange
rate, wages, consumption, and the trade-balance-to-gdp ratio under superﬁcial habits. There
are several important diﬀerences between the predictions of the models with deep and su-
perﬁcial habits. Speciﬁcally, the superﬁcial-habit model has the counterfactual implications
that the real exchange rate appreciates and that consumption falls following an expansionary
government spending shock.1 We conclude that in the context of our model, deep habits
are essential in generating responses in relative prices and aggregate absorption that are
1The reason why the real exchange rate appreciates in the absence of deep habits has to do with home
bias (ω>0.5). An increase in domestic absorption triggers a relatively higher increase in the demand for
home goods (good a). The required expenditure switch is brought about through an increase in the relative
price of good a. The rise in the relative price of good a is also responsible for a mild increase in the real
wage rate measured in units of total consumption. Under superﬁcial habits and in the absence of home
bias (ω =0 .5), neither the real exchange rate nor the real wage rate respond to innovations in government
spending. Consumption falls because of the negative wealth eﬀect associated with the increase in resources
absorbed by the domestic government. In the deep habit model, this negative wealth eﬀect is also present,
but is dominated by a substitution eﬀect stemming from elevated real wages.
11qualitatively in line with the available empirical evidence.
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